GM← Back to GMLAUNCH APP
EXPLAINER

BKTLS

= blind-knowledge TLS

How GM brings social data on chain so that nobody has to trust anybody. Not X’s API key holder, not an oracle operator, not even us.

THE PROBLEM

CONTRACTS CAN’T READ X

A smart contract only sees the blockchain. To know that you said gm, something has to bring X’s answer on chain, and so far that something was always a party you had to trust.

Our own backend

One company decides who said gm. One revoked API key stops the coin. That’s how GM v1 went quiet.

An oracle network

Moves the trust to oracle operators, and X can still cut every node off by revoking one set of keys.

zkTLS / MPC-TLS

No trusted hardware, but heavy: hundreds of MB of preprocessing, GBs of RAM, tens of seconds per check.

A TEE that logs in for you

Fast, but your cookie or API key sits inside someone else’s enclave, and every request comes from a datacenter IP.

HOW IT WORKS

ONE CHECK, FOUR MOVES

WHO SEES WHAT

NEAR contractTEE notaryProviderGM team
Provider’s X loginnonoyesno
TLS session keysnoyesnono
Raw answer from Xnoyesyesno
Can fake a gmnononono

HOW IT STACKS UP

Backend / oraclezkTLS / MPC-TLSTEE with your loginbkTLS
Who can fake datathe operatornobody (crypto)only the TEE vendoronly the TEE vendor
Who sees your X loginthe operatornobodythe enclavenobody, it stays home
IP that X seesdatacenteryoursdatacenterthe provider’s own
Cost per checkAPI feesGBs of RAM, tens of secondsone TEE jobone TEE job, ~0.5 s
WHAT IT GIVES GM

No trusted server

Data comes from X over TLS, an attested notary records it, and the contract re-derives every post.

Anyone can be a provider

A laptop with an X login, a server with an API key, or no login at all. Providers compete on price.

Credentials stay home

The desktop app’s live log shows every request. The cookie crosses the tunnel as 0 readable bytes.

Hard to switch off

Requests come from many ordinary connections instead of one key or one datacenter.

One check is final

No crowd of watchers, disputes or slashing. A small project can run it from day one.

Works beyond X

Any HTTPS source can plug in. Social data from more networks is next.

TRUST AND LIMITS, PLAINLY

  • You trust the TEE hardware (Intel TDX under OutLayer) and the notary build, whose hash is pinned on chain.
  • A dishonest provider can make a check fail, never fake one. Failures lower its public success rate.
  • We are not the first to notarize TLS with a TEE. The closest prior work, Reclaim’s reclaim-tee, keeps credentials from the key holder with two TEEs. bkTLS does it with one, plus oblivious transfer.

ABOUT THE NAME 😄

zkTLS is “zero knowledge”. Ours is bkTLS, “blind knowledge”: the TEE runs the whole TLS session and could, in theory, see everything, but it is blind to the one thing that matters, the provider’s X cookie or API key. It knows exactly what X said, and has no idea whose login asked.

Want the deep dive? How TLS, zkTLS and bkTLS work and how they compare, in the full article.

MORE AT NEVERKNOWER.DEV/BKTLS ↗